Related book: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and DeceptionBethany McLean and Bill Ackman on Charlie Rose (video) (LINK)
Related book: Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the U.S. Mortgage GiantsA Fireside Chat with Bill Gurley of Benchmark: The Future of Ecommerce (video) (LINK)
Related book: The Age of CryptocurrencyDrug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight (LINK)
Irving Kahn: “Considering the downside is the single most important thing an investor must do. This task must be dealt with before any consideration can be made for gains. The problem is that people nowadays think they’re pretty smart because they can do something quite rapidly. You can make the horse gallop. But are you on the right path? Can you see where you’re going?”Thoughts on Negative Interest Rates (LINK)
If you examine the 2000-2002 period, you’ll notice that the market responded to Fed easing by losing value, on average, as it did again during the 2007-2009 collapse. However, in the 2000-2002 collapse, most of the overall market damage was in periods that fell outside the 4-week period after a Fed move. In contrast, some of the most severe market losses during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis occurred immediately on the heels of Federal Reserve easing moves. Indeed, the S&P 500 lost over 40% of its value in a 12-week period between September-November 2008 as the Fed continued to frantically cut rates – an easing cycle that began several weeks before the 2007 market peak.
Many investors seem to be hoping for QE4. They should be careful what they wish for, because in an environment of investor risk-aversion, the initiation of QE4 would very likely be associated with an outcome much like 2008 – it would likely be a response to unexpected economic deterioration. Unlike most of the period since 2009, investors no longer appear to have the risk-seeking preferences that supported speculation during previous bouts of QE.
Since the third quarter of 2014, market internals have been decidedly unfavorable on our measures, as has the expected market return/risk profile that we classify on the basis of observable data. These shifts indicate that investors have subtly shifted from risk-seeking preferences to risk-averse preferences.